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ABSTRACT
The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 included the largest business tax cut
inU.S. history, embodied in the Accelerated Cost Recovery System. This paper
describes in detail the provisions of the new treatment of depreciable property,
and analyzes in a fairly nontechnical way its economic impact.
Particular attention is paid to a novel part of ACRS that creates a "safe
harbor" for a wide range of sale—leaseback arrangements, effectively permitting





(6r()95—393The Economic Recovery Tax Act (hereafter ERTA) of 1981 included several
significant changes in the tax law that together represent the most substantial
cut in corporate and personal income taxes since their introduction in 1913. A
particularly important and controversial element of ERTA is the radical change
in business depreciation practice introduced by the Accelerated Cost Recovery
System (hereafter ACRS). Under ACRS, tax lifetimes are, in general, substan-
tially reduced; there are now only three distinct depreciationclasses1 where
there previously were well over a hundred; the investment tax credit has been
liberalized; and a "safe harbor" has been created for a broad class of leasing
arrangements to permit firms without taxable income effectively to sell their
depreciation allowances and investment credits to corporations with taxable
income. These changes, to be fully phased in by the end of 1985, are expected
ultimately to produce a large revenue loss to the Treasury, with estimates
varying from billion dollars2 to 61.3 billion dollars3 for fiscal year
1986.In comparison, the total collection of the corporate income tax amounted
to 6.6 billion dollars in l98O) Thus, it would appear that, as a source of
revenue, the corporate tax has been eliminated to a great extent. However,
while this may be true in the aggregate, some significant differences remain,
and others have been introduced, in the tax treatment of different investments
and different investors that would not have existed had the corporate tax simply
been phased out.
This acceleration of depreciation allowances is likely to have important
consequences for the mix and level of investment in the U.S. over the next
several years. After reviewing the history of investment incentives in the U.S.,
we will examine the new tax law, as it relates to depreciation, and compare it—2—
with alternatives that arose during the policy discussion leading up to the
passage of the Economic Recovery TaxAct.In Section IV, we review the criteria
economists use in evaluating changes in the tax treatment of investment.
Section V presents an economic analysis of ACRS, and also touches on the rela-
tive merits of some of the other recent proposals alluded to above. Section VI
reviews separately a particularly important part of ACRS, the liberalization of
sale—leaseback arrangements, and the last section offers some concluding com-
ments on the state of the corporate income tax.-.3—
I.A Brief History of Investment Incentives in the U.S.
The first major change in the tax law aimed specifically at encouraging
business investment was the Revenue Act of l954, which permitted purchasers of
assets two forms of "accelerated" depreciation for tax purposes as alternatives
to the normal practice of the time, straight—line depreciation. The two new
methods, sum of the years digits and double declining balance, both permit a
large fraction of an asset's depreciation deductions to be taken in the years
shortly after its acquisition. This shifting of deductions toward earlier years
is equivalent to an interest—free loan to the purchaser, since it allows a
deferral of tax payments to later years with no increase in the amount due.
Other major changes in depreciation practice before 1981 occured in 1962 and
1911. The introduction of depreciation guidelines by the Treasury in 1962 per-
mitted investors to write assets off over a shorter period than had been typi-
cally true before. The Revenue Act of 1911 created the Asset Depreciation Range
(ADR) system, under which the purchaser of a qualifying asset was permitted to
select a tax lifetime of between 80 and 120 percent of the 1962 guideline life
established for the appropriate asset class. The ADR system applied to personal
property (equipment), but not depreciable real property (structures). Moreover,
its election made the tax accounting more complicated for the investor. Added
complexity has been offered as one explanation for the fact that many smaller
businesses had failed to adopt ADR, even several years after its introduction,5
and also continued to use straight—line depreciation rather than one of the
accelerated methods 6
The othermajor element of tax system with a direct and narrow effect on
investmentisthe investment tax credit (ITc). Introduced in the Revenue Act_)4
of1962 at a rate of 7 percent on new investment, it was suspended for a brief
period between 1966 and 1961, "permanently" removed in 1969, reintroduced in
1911, and increased to 10 percent in the Tax Reduction Act of 1915. Like the
Asset Depreciation Range, the ITC did not (and still does not) apply to depre-
ciable real property, and applied at reduced rates for short—lived equipment
with tax lives of less than seven years. This last feature of the ITC consti-
tuted the main reason an investor would have for using ADR to elect a tax life-
time in excess of an asset's guideline life.
While not limited to income from investment, tax rate reductions, especially
in the corporate sector, have been viewed as a way of stimulating investment
activity. Except for a ten percent surcharge during the Viet Nam War, the cor-
porate tax has drifted downward during the last two decades, with a reduction to
15 percent from 52 percent in l961 and a further reduction to 46percentin
1978.
Econometric evidence varies on the degree of stimulus provided by each of
these changes in the tax law, though there is general agreement among economists
that tax incentives do influence the scale and type of investment that occurs.1
The formulation and adoption in 1981 of the Accelerated Cost Recovery System
grew in part from a general perception that not enough investment in plant and
equipment was taking place.—5—
II.The Accelerated Cost Recovery System
The key aspect of ACRS is the shortening and simplification of depreciation
schedules applicable to personal and real property. A number of its other pro-
visions were necessitated by this acceleration of depreciation allowances.
Effective January 1, 1981, most new personal (section l245) property quali-
fies for one of two depreciation classes. Autos, light—duty trucks, and other
personal property with a midpoint life of four years or less under the old ADR
system qualify for a three—year write—off. bst other equipment may be depre-
ciated over five years. Important exceptions are long—lived public utility
property. Such property with an ADR midpoint life of between eighteen and
twenty—five years now may depreciated over ten years, while a fifteen—year
write—off is permitted for public utility assets with an ADR midpoint life
greater than twenty—five years. Real (section 1250) property is assigned to a
fifteen—year recovery period. This system of few depreciation classes and fast
write—offis essentially the Capital Cost Recovery Act, or the "ten—five—three"
scheme originally propsed by Congressmen Conable and Jones in 1979, except that
therecovery period for real property has been lengthened.
The use of January 1, 1981, as the effective date for the legislation was
meant to fulfill the promise given during the legislative debate that all
investment occuring then would qualify for the new liberalized tax treatment.
Property purchased before 1981 does not qualify for ACRS, but used property
purchased after January 1, 1981, does. That is, ACRS applies to all property
purchased by the current owner after the effective date, regardless of when the
asset was originally manufactured, sold and placed in service. This application—6—
ofACES to used property is limited to "real" transactions by a series of
"anti—churning" rules. For transfers between related parties or sale—leaseback
arrangements, the latter also receiving greatly liberalized treatment under ACRS
(see below), the purchaser must continue previous depreciation practice.
The new legislation also specifies the pattern of depreciation allowances to
be used for each of the recovery classes. For personal property placed in ser-
vice between 1981 and 19814, the allowances mimic the use of 150 percent
declining balance with a switch—over to straight—line in the second year and
adoptionof the half—year convention, under which all assets purchased in a
given tax year are treated as if they were purchased six months into the year.
For 1985, the schedule for new personal property approximates 175 percent
declining balance with a second—year switchover to sum—of—the—years digits. For
1986 and after, the pattern of allowances follows 200 percent declining balance
with a second—year switchover to sum—of—the—year's—digits. These recovery sche-
dules are summarized in ble 1. It should be noted that the switchover to
straight—line or sum—of—the—year's—digits in the second year does not
necessarily maximize the value of switching over to the investor. For example,
for 1981—19814, a switchover to straight—line in the third year would give a
larger second year allowance for assets in the five—year class.
For real property in the fifteen—year recovery class, except low income ren-
tal housing, allowances are not specified in the law but are supposed to
approximate the benefits of using 175 percent declining balance with an optimal—7—
Table 1
Recovery Schedules under ACRS
Class
Year of Purchase 3 Year 5 Year
%Allowancein Year 1981_1419851986— i98i-J419851986—
1 25% 29% 33% 15% 18% 20%
2 387 I5 22 33 32
3 372 22 21 25 2I
21 16 16
5 21 8 8—8—
switchoverto straight—line. Low income housing qualifies for 200 percent
declining balance with a switchover to straight—line. Unlike the rules for per-
sonal property, no half—year convention is applied here.
In addition to the above depreciation schedules, investors may also
elect to use straight—line over the entire recovery period, or to use straight—
line over one of two "extended" recovery periods specified for each recovery
class. For purposes of calculating earnings and profits to determine whether
dividends are taxable or represent a return of capital, the shorter of the
extended recovery periods and straight—line depreciation must be used, unless
the longer extended recovery period is elected for tax purposes, in which case
it must be used for calculating earnings and profits. This provision represents
an attempt to prevent the "losses" at the corporate level generated by ACRS from
spilling over into the personal tax treatment of corporate distributions. Under
previous law, the same lifetime applied to the calculation of earnings and pro-
fits and the calculation of tax depreciation (although straight—line was always
assumed for the former). The use of different lifetimes for the two calcula-
tions is consonant with the view that the recovery periods are no longer
intended to bear any close relationship to the concept of an asset's "useful
life".
As a result of the shortening of recovery periods for asset depreciation, a
number of other issues had to be addressed as part of the same tax legislation.
First of all, so that assets in the three—year recovery class would not be
limited to an investment tax credit of 3—1/3 percent (whereas many such assets
previously could qualify for the full 10 percent credit through the use of the ADR—9—
Table2
Extended Recovery Periods





system), the credit for this class was set at 6 percent. Similarly, all other
personal property, in the five, ten and fifteen year classes, receives the full
10 percent credit.
A second related issue is the recapture of accelerated depreciation upon the
sale of an asset. The treatment of personal property remains the same: all sale
proceeds representing prior depreciation are taxed at ordinary rather than term
capital gains rates. For example, the sale of an asset purchased for 100
dollars, with a current basis of 20 dollars, will result in the ordinary taxa-
tion of the difference between the sale price and 20 dollars for anysaleprice
up to 100 dollars and capital gains taxation of anyamountby which sale price
exceeds 100 dollars. The treatment of real property is exactly the same if
straight—line is not used. If straight—line is used, then the previous method
of recapture for real property applies: only the difference between straight—
line basis and actual basis (in this case zero) is subject to ordinary income
taxation. Thus, a disincentive has been introduced against the use of the full
ACRS depreciation benefits for those purchasers of real estate who intend to
sell after a reasonably short period.
The recapture of the investment credit is similar to previous law. It must
'be "givenback" rata (though without interest) if the period the asset was
heldbeforeresale was less than the mininum specified for full credit. Thus,
an asset in the five year class sold after three years would have to pay back 140
percent of the credit originally received. The ERTA also increases, to 125
thousand dollars in 1981 and 150 thousand dollars in 1985 (from 100 thousand—11—
dollars currently), the amount of newly purchased used property to which an
investor can appy the investment tax credit. To the extent of this limitation,
it is now possible to obtain the full ITC every five years on a qualifying asset
through resale.
The final issue raised by the large acceleration of depreciation allowances
is that many taxpayers will be thrown into the position of having a net
operating loss, for tax purposes. Since the income tax is not refundable, this
would impose a limitation on the extent to which the tax benefits of the new
legislation could be obtained. Onemethodof lessening this effect was the
increase in carry over period for net operating losses and the investment tax
credit to fifteen years from the previously permitted three year carry back and
sevenyear carry forward. However, this extension of the carryover period only
partiallyextends the range offirms capable of benefitting from ACRS. Firms
witha record of losses or new firms without any record of profit or loss must
still carry net operating losses forward, which involves a loss in interest on
the delayed depreciation deductions as well as a cash flow constraint. Th
increase further the coverage of ACRS, the Economic Recovery Tax Act created a
"safe harbor" for a broad range of sale—leaseback arrangements, the effect of
which is to allow transactions which are very similar to the outright sale of
depreciation deductions and investment tax credits. Basically, as long as the
lessor is a corporation and has an "at risk" investment of at least 10 percent
of the asset's adjusted basis throughout the lease, the transaction will be
characterized as a lease. Among the things allowed within this "safe harbor"—12—
are financing of the other 90 percent of the purchase price by the lessee;
retention by the lessee of nominal ownership of the property for other legal
purposes (e.g. title possession and payment of local property taxes, etc.) and
resale arrangements whereby the lessor is obligated to sell the asset back to
the lessee at the termination of the lease below fair market value. With these
provisions, it is possible (see the example in Section vi) to structure a lease
so that lessor and lessee need exchange money only at the commencement of the
lease. Such an arrangement would appear to make the lease indistinguishable
from the simple sale of depreciation allowances and investment credits.
However, while there have been recent Treasury regulations on this issue, it is not
yet entirely clear that lessors can fully escape all risks associated with the
potential bankruptcy of lessees. Moreover, in the case of mass transportation
equipment owned by state and local governments and financed by tax—exempt bonds,
the current leasing arrangements allow the lessee to be a non—taxable entity.
This makes it possible for such an government to "sell" credits and depreciation
allowances for which it would never be eligible itself.
As always, the revenue cost of such a large tax reduction as ACRS is dif-
ficult to measure with any precision, because such a calculation requires esti-
mates of how much investment (and other sources of revenue) will occur with ACRS
as well as how much would have occurred without ACRS. While macroeconomic
models exist and can be applied for such purposes, one can have confidence only
in the rough magnitudes rather than the exact values of predictions. This is
not a fault of the model—builders; there is simply too much uncertainty about the
future to make precise forcasts. Nevertheless, it is interesting to examine the
revenue costs that have been projected for ACRS.—13—
Table 3 presents estimates by the Joint Committee on Taxation and the Office
of Tax Analysis of the Treasury of the annual revenue loss that will occur
because of the adoption of ACRS during the fiscal years 1981—1986. The estima-
tes, which are quite similar, predict an annual loss which grows steadily
throughout the period, and presumably, would continue to grow if calculations
for later years were available. There are three reasons for this growth.
First, as the nominal amount of investment grows (through real growth as well as
inflation) so will the depreciation deductions and investment credits received.
Moreover, only that fraction of capital purchased after 1981 will be receiving
the new depreciation allowances. As the years pass, this will include a larger
and larger fraction of the total capital stock. Finally, the phase—in provi-
sion, for personal property, of the degree of acceleration of deductions over
the specified recovery period, must also contribute to a growth in revenue cost.
While these numbers are large by historical standards, they appear small
relative to the revenue losses projected by OTA and JCT resulting from the per-
sonal tax cut. For example, JCF projects a loss of 196 billion dollars in 1986
alone from personal tax cuts,8 while OTA estimates the loss to be 17J4 billion
dollars.9However, these numbers are not really comparable to the estimates
for ACRS since, even with a constant rate of inflation, "bracket creep" caused
by the progressivity of the individual rate schedule would have caused the tax
receipts to rise. No similar increase is built into the corporate tax, since
the tax rate on virtually all income is the same. Thus, a large portion of the
individual rate cut is not really a tax cut in the samesensethat all of ACRS
is.10_)4_
Table3
Revenue Cost of ACRS
(Billions of Dollars)







*U.S.Department of the Treasury, Office of TaxAnalysis, cit.
**U.S.Joint Committee on Taxation, cit.—15—
III: Other Proposals
While effective opposition to ACHS never surfaced in Congress, there were a
number of alternatives proposed by members of the House and Senate as well as
the Carter Administration, beginning in 1980. One proposal, passed by the
Senate Finance Committee in the summer of 1980, would have established four,
rather than two recovery classes for personal property, excluding public utility
property, with lengths of two, four, seven and ten years rather than three and
five.11Under "2——1—lO," assets in the two and four year classes were to
receive an investment tax credit of 2.5 and 6 percent, respectively, with the
other classes receiving the full credit. Public utility property was given a
liberalizedAJJR variance of 30 percent, but otherwise unaffected. Investors in
real property were allowed a twenty—year lifetime, with straight—line depre-
ciation, andthe option of using a fifteen—year straight—line write—off for low
income rental housing and a fifteen—year, 150 percent declining balance write-
off for owner—occupied non—residential structures. The bill also would have cut
the top corporate tax rate to 1i.L percent.
The pattern of depreciation allowances to be applied to assets in the four
personal property classes was somewhat novel. The investor would have been per-
mitted to use 200 percent, 150 percent or 100 percent declining balance, but
these percentages were to be applied to the total basis of all assets owned by
the investor in the relevant recovery class, rather than separately to assets of
different ages. M3reover, the percentage declining balance could be changed
annually at the discretion of the investor. Finally, current recapture rules
for personal property would have been replaced by the requirement that the sale—i6.-
price of an asset of which an owner had disposed be deducted from the basis of
all relevant recovery class accounts; assets sold were thus to be treated in a
way symmetrical to assets purchased.
A main benefit of this system of aggregate personal property depreciation
was its simplicity, replacing "vintage accounts" kept for assets by recovery
class and year of purchase with "open—ended accounts" for all assets in each
class. This type of simplification only could be possible in conjunction with
the move to a constant rate declining balance forraila, since the age structure
of the assets being depreciated then would have no effect on the total amount of
deductions; only the basis of each asset would be relevant, and these could be
added together before, rather than after, the application of the percentage
depreciation rate. Since ACRS uses combinations of depreciation methods, rather
than a single declining balance formula for each recovery class, it requires
continuance of the more complicated vintage account system.
The scheme put forward by the Carter Administration in 1980, referred to as
"constant—rate depreciation", was similar to 2_14_7_l0 in that it called for a
reduction in the number of capital recovery classes (to 30) and the application
of a constant—rate declining balance formula to open—ended recovery accounts.
Neither 2_1_7_lO nor constant—rate depreciation would have provided tax reduc-
tions as large as those given by ACRS. This can be seen clearly from Table ,
whichcompares the revenue costs of the forerunner to ACRS, 10—5—3, with those
of 2_I_7_1Q and CRD. (The 74.5 billion dollar loss in 1986 under 10—5—3 exceeds
those for ACRS cited above because of changes such as the lengthening of the
real property recovery period.) Two other proposed changes in depreciation—17—
Table 4
RevenueCost Estimates of 10—5—3 arid Two Alternatives*
(Billions of Dollars)
Fiscal Year 10—5—3 2—4—1—10 CRD
1981 2.9 14.3 2.9
1982 10.8 13.7' 9.0
1983 22.1 i8.6 14.2
1984 37.8 19.0 18.4
1985 56.3 19.7' 22.2
1986 74.5 21.0 25.4
*Assumesa January 1, 1981 effective date.
Source: Congressional Budget Office, ,cit.—18—
practice would have replaced the stream of depreciation deductions reeceived by
an asset over its tax lifetime, or recovery period, with a single deduction in
the year of purchase. Under the First Year Capital Recovery System (FYCRS),
originally formulated by Alan Auerbach and Dale Jorgenson12, each asset would
have been assigned a capital recovery deduction in the year of purchase equal
to a certain fraction of full purchase price, with the exact value of this frac-
tion varying across classes of assets according to durability. Very short—lived
assets would have received nearly a dollar in allowances for each dollar spent,
while very long—lived assets would have been given less than half of the
purchase price as a deduction.
The method of calculating such first—year allowances was to estimate the
fraction of its value an asset would lose during each year of its productive
life, and take the present value of such annual measures of "economic
depreciation" using a discount rate ofpercent.For example, an asset
purchased for 100 dollars new, and expected to lose one—tenth of its value every
year, would receive a deduction of $71.143, or about 71—1/2 cents for each dollar
of capital purchased-3. Like 2—b—7—l0, FYCRS would have introduced symmetric
treatment to the disposal of assets, with sellers including in income the same
amount that purchasers could deduct, the sale price niiltiplied by the first—year
allowance. It would also have been very simple, for assets would always have a
basis of zero, eliminating the need for record—keepping. Some versions of the
first year system also called for a repeal of the investment tax credit.—19—
A related, but simpler and considerably more generous proposal, was made by
Democrats in the House shortly before the adoption of ACRS in 1981. This would
have permitted a full, rather than fractional, write—off of personal property in
the first—year of acquisition, repealed the investment tax credit, and gradually
brought the corporate rate down to 3)4 percent. The revenue loss for this plan
was thought to be similar to ACRS.
All proposals, both ACRS and various others, stressed simplicity, and most
would have lowered to some extent the tax burden on capital investment.
However, they differed in a number of respects important from an economic
perspective, including
(1) the overall tax burden on investment;
(2) the distribution of this tax burden across different assets;
(3) the sensitivity of this burden to inflation;
(4) the revenue loss per dollar of investment; and
(5) the distribution of incentives between the investments of taxable and
non—taxable investors.—20—
IV. EvaluationCriteria
To explore these differences and their importance, it is necessary to
discuss first the economic criteria that are involved. First of all, it has
long been recognized that virtually all taxes distort economic behavior. This
reduction in economic efficiency is referred to as the "deadweight loss" or
"excess burdent' of the tax system. While it may be inevitable that some effi-
ciency be sacrificed in order to raise revenue, not all taxes impose the same
excess burden per dollar of revenue raised. Some tax structures are more effi-
cient than others, and the area of study called t1optil tax theory" seeks to
characterize tax systems that are relatively efficient. While the results of
such work are fairly complicated, certain basic rules do come out. First, it is
usually more efficient to tax activities (e.g. types of income or purchases)
that are relatively unresponsive to price changes. For example, how high the
overall tax burden on savings and investment ought to be, from an efficiency
perspective, would depend on how responsive savings is to changes in the after—
tax rate of return15. A second general rule is that it is relatively inef-
ficient to raise revenue through a distortion of production activity. Such a
distortion would arise in the allocation of capital, for example, if different
types of investment were taxed at different rates. Such differential taxation
would cause a shift of investment into the more lightly taxed types of asset.
The term "neutrality" is often used to describe a tax sytem that does not
distort production efficiency. Of course, full neutrality with respect to the
allocation of capital would call for comparable treatment of nonbusiness capital
and business capital. The former consists mostly of owner—occupied housing,—21—
which currently receives very favorable treatment under the tax law. To the
extent that taxes on capital are higher in the business sector, any proposal
which lowers them, by effecting a shift of capital from residential to non-
residential uses, would increase allocative efficiency.
A related issue is how the tax treatment of assets is influenced by changes
in the inflation rate. Under any capital recovery system where depreciation
allowances are based on original cost, the effect of inflation is to lower the
real value of future depreciation allowances. Their dollar value is unaffected,
but they are worth less in terms of purchasing power. This effect of inflation
may reduce economic efficiency for two reasons. First, in raising theoverall
tax burden on investment income to what might be an inefficiently high level
arid, second, in its differential impact across different investments, leading
to production distortions.
How much "bang per buck" a tax reduction has, i.e., how much new investment
will be generated by reductions in tax revenue, depends on at least three fac-
tors. First, how effective is the tax reduction at focusing on the behavior it
seeks to encourage? In the current context, this depends on the treatment of
old versus new assets. Plans that reduce the tax burden on income from existing
assets are more costly because only part of the tax reduction goes toward
encouraging new investmentl6. Second, how is the plan phased in over time? It
is possible to encourage or discourage investment today through the changes in
tax structure that are scheduled to occur in the near future. An example of
this is the phasing in under ACRS of the full depreciation deductions for per-
sonal property investments between 1981 and 1986. Third, how responsive is—22—
investment to tax incentives? This depends on a number of factors, including
the responsiveness of businesses to changes in the tax treatment of investment
income as well as the responsiveness of savers to the net rate of return. The
latter matters because if a tax cut does stimulate investment, businesses will
seek more funds in the capital market. As they do so, the price of funds, the
interest rate, will be bid up. How high it mustgodepends on how responsive
savers are to its increase. Empirical evidence on this savings responsiveness is
weak. Evidence on the responsiveness of business to tax incentives suggests
that previous changes in depreciation schedules and the investment tax credit
have led to increased investment, although different views exist about the
magnitudes involved-T.
Finally an issue relevant to the current discussion is the treatment of
similar assets purchased by different investors, particularly those with and
without taxable income. Because investment incentives are often considered when
at least some sectors of the econonr are in recession, the need to have taxable
income to offset increased deductions or credits may restrict the ability of
many firms to take advantage of the tax cut. Whether this is economically
desirable is open to question. On one side is the argument that full coverage
(via refundability, for example) encourages poorly managed companies to continue
operation. On the other hand, profits as measured for tax purposes only vaguely
resemble real economic earnings, and the "bad management" argument can not be
fairly applied to new firms without any earnings history. Indeed, the indirect-
ness and complication of the new "safe harbor" leasing included in ACRS seems
to have been aimed in part at satisfying proponents on each side of this argu-
ment.—23—
V.The Economics of ACRS
The design of ACRS limits the ability of investors to get any additional tax
benefits for assets first put in service before January 1, 1981. In this sense,
it should have a large "bang per buck" relative to other proposals that included
a reduction in corporate taxes, since the latter would have reduced taxes even
for those making no new investments.As indicated above, the anti—churning
rules prevent a taxpayer from obtaining ACRS benefits on property the taxpayer
put in service prior to 1981. And, while itispossible under the statute to
obtainACRS on used property through a transfer of ownership, the full tax bene-
fits might be negative. This is because the prospective increase in depre-
ciation allowanceswould be accompanied by an immediate recapture of earlier
deductions. For example, suppose a piece of equipment was purchased for 100
dollars, received the investment tax credit, now has a basis of zero and a
potential sale price of 1O dollars. If a sale occurred, the seller would pay
taxes immediately on ).O dollars of income, while the purchaser could take deduc-
tions equal to 1O dollars over five years. If they were in the same tax
bracket, the taxes paid by the seller would exceed, in present value, the taxes
avoided by the purchaser. Only to the limited extent that the investment tax
credit could be taken again might this transaction be worthwhile. For struc-
tures, the tax on recapture would be lower because of the capital gains treat-
ment of the gain over straight—line basis. However, the present value of
prospective deductions under ACRS also would be smaller, for the deductions must
be taken over a period of fifteen rather than five years. While particular
cases in which a sale would generate tax benefits are possible, this does not
appear to be a large problem, particularly because this type of sale cannot be
done in conjunction with a sale—leaseback arrangement.— 2b—
Theother part of the "bang per buck" question concerns the phase—in of
ACRSfor personal property. Because investments made in 1986 (and 1985,to a
lesser extent)will receive more favorable treatment than assets purchased in
1981through 1984,some investors who possess a degree of flexibility in the
timingof their purchases may waituntil 1986 to invest. This will lessen the
expansionary effect of ACRS in the next four years. Whether this is good or bad
from a macroeconomic perspective largely depends on the severity of the current
recession and how expansionary the rest of the federal government's tax—
expenditure program ultimately turns out to be.
In order to evaluate the burden imposed on different investments under ACRS,
we calculate and display in ble 5 values, discounted at an after—tax rate of
12 percent, of depreciation allowances received by typical investments in the
three, five and fifteen years classes. For the three and five year classes, the
deduction equivalent to the investment credit (for a corporation in the top
bracket), labelled "A", is also calculated to obtain the combined effect of
investment related credits and deductions. These values rise over time for the
personal property classes because of the phase—in, but exceed one even in 1981.
This means that the combination of depreciation deductions and the investment
credit offers a greater tax shield than immediate expensing without the ITC, the
alternative proposed by House Democrats in 1981. This is not the case for most
structures, which receive the equivalent of about fifty—five cents in deductions
per dollar invested.
A useful way of understanding these numbers is to ask what reduction in tax
rate the investor would require in exchange for giving up the credits and deduc——25-.
Table5




Asset Class 1981—1984 1985 1986
3 year
PV of Deductions .88)42 .9010 .9072
ITO /.)46 .130)4 .130)4 .130)4
Total (A) 1.01)47 1.0314 1.0376
5 year
PV of Deductions .7968 .8387 .8)418
ITC/.146 .217)4 .217)4 .2174
Total (A) 1.01)42 1.0561 1.0592
15 year**
PV of Deductions .5515 .5515 .5515
ITC/.)46 0 0 0
Total (A) .5515 .5515 .5515
*Basedon the schedules reported in Table 1.
**Basedon 175 percent declining balance with a switchover to straight—line in
year 8 and purchase 6 months into the tax year.—26—
tions of ACRS for those consistent with economic depreciation; that is, what
effective tax rate on true economic income is imposed by the combination of a
statutory tax rate of 16 percent on investment tax credit and a rapid write—off.
To derive this effective tax rate, we imist know what the economic depreciation
of assets actually is, and must make assumptions about the inflation rate and
the real after—tax rate of return earned by corporations on their investments.
Table 6 presents effective tax rate calculations for five representative types
of investment in the three main recovery classes. For a real discount rate, we
use L percentl8. Estimates of declining—balance rates of economic depreciation
are obtained from a recent U.S. Treasury study.19 Effective tax rates for each
asset are computed for inflation rates of 6 percent and 8 percent.
Perhaps the most startling result in Table 6 is that most of the tax rates
are negative: investors would prefer ACRS to the abolition of corporate taxa-
tion, for assets in the three—year and five—year recovery classes. This outcome
is perfectly possible, and consistent with the results in Table 5, where such
assets were found to have equivalent deductions and credits in excess of imrne—
diate write—off. In fact, these conditions are the same. As others have
pointed out in the past, immediate write—off converts the corporate tax to a
"partnership" where government bears an equal percentage ofcostsand receipts,
witheach "partner" earning the before—tax rate of return on investment.
Hence, a system more generous than immediate write—off is equivalent to govern-
ment bearinga greater fraction of the initial cost than it receives of the
futureflows: it is subsidizing the project. Furthermore, these calculations
assumeno debt is used to finance the project. Since interest payments are tax—27—
Table 6
Effective ¶Lx Rates under ACRS*
Economic ETR for
Asset Recovery Depreciation Inflation Rate =
Class Period (years) Rate** 6% 8%















Industrial Buildings15 .036 39.4 42.1
Commercial Buildings15 .025 35.8 38.3
*Derived according to formula t =T/[1+()(A—--)1
where T =.46,r =.04,A is as defined in Table 5 and 5 is the economic
depreciation rate. Further details provided by the auther upon request.
** Estimated rate of declining—balance economic depreciation; see text.—28—
deductible, these additional tax savings would make the effective tax rates more
negative for projects financed in part by borrowing.
These negative tax rates differ across types of personal property, but the
key difference is between personal property and real property. At an inflation
rate of 6 percent, the effective tax rates on industrial buildings and general
industrial equipment would differ by almost 98 percentage points after 1985.
This poses an enormous distortion in the allocation of industrial capital.
Aside from differing by asset class, the effective tax rates also depend on
the inflation rate that prevails. This is because, depreciation allowances
received in future years are eroded to the extent that prices rise between the
date of purchase and the date of the allowance. These rates rise more for the
personal property classes, though they are still negative at an inflation rate
of 8 percent. In fact, it would take a long—run inflation rate of 14 percent to
bring the post—1985 effective tax rate out of the negative range.
These effective tax rates, especially those for equipment, are substantially
lower than those that would have applied had any of the alternative to ACRS
discussed above been enacted. For example, under "2—1—7—l0", the effective tax
rates at 8 percent inflation would have been —0.50 percent for trucks, buses and
trailers, +0.65 percent for construction machinery and +0.85 percent for
general industrial equipment2° ——virtuallythe same as in the House expensing
proposal. The Carter Administration proposal specifically precluded the total
tax benefits for any asset from exceeding those of expensing. Under the First—
Year System with no investment tax credit, the effective tax rate would have
been 16 percent for all assets.—29--
The effective tax rates under ACRS are also more sensitive to inflation than
would have been true under either the expensing or First Year proposals. Since
each of the latter two plans offered a deduction only in the year of purchase,
the value of such deductions would not have been influenced by fluctuations in
the rate of inflation.
Aside from the distortion caused by such large differences in tax rates
among investments competing for the same funds, it is not necessarily efficient
to tax corporate capital income at a rate near or below zero, in the aggre-
gate.21However, given that such rates were being set, a serious problem of
coverage would have arisen had not something like the safe—harbor for leasing
been created at the same time. Indeed, this problem would have become more
acute over the years, as greater fractions of the assets owned by companies fell
under ACRS. The tax losses generated by even profitable investments would, for
a number of companies, outweigh taxable income generated by real property,
pre—1981 depreciable assets and non—depreciable assets. Indeed, the revenue cost
estimates of ACRS cited in the introduction are so large a part of total cor-
porate tax collections that this problem is obvious without detailed calcula—
t ions.—30—
VI. Leasing
The new safe—harbor leasing rules make it possible to structure a transac-
tion so that "lessor" makes a single, initial payment to "lessee", obtains in
return the investment tax credit and depreciation deductions on the designated
property, and all contact between the two parties may then cease. However, the
exact details of the agreement will determine how much the lessor is willing to
payforthe credits and deductions. One purpose of the analysis that follows is
to show this and to give a numerical example of one such hypothetical transac-
tion.
Another issue that arises in the discussion of leasing is the question of
whether it should be available to all firms with tax losses. Imagine two types
of firms with current net operating losses and without the availability of a
carry back against previous taxable income. rpe I, the "high growth" firm, has
"losses" primarily because of the amount of investment it is undertaking. It
will have profits in future years. The pe II firm, of which Chrysler might be
an example, already has lots of tax losses to carry forward. Even if its
current investments generate a taxable profit, this company will be able to off-
set such profit using its net operating loss carry forwards. For the forseeable
future, it is essentially non—taxable. Without leasing, both would have to
carry forward those tax benefits associated with the ITC and depreciation deduc-
tions. Even with taxable income in the future to offset by these losses, the
companies would receive a lower present discounted value from these tax shields.
In the case of rpe I firms, this would put them at a competitive disadvantage—31—
with firms having taxable income: they would have to pay taxes on theirgross
income when earned, but carry forward their deductions at the beginning.
Leasing would put them on a par with taxable firms. However, since Type II
firms expect to pay no tax on their earnings, should they, too, be allowed the
full value of their deductions? The apparent answer is no, that this would give
them a tax advantage over the other types of firm. However, as we discuss
below, the problem is really more complicated because of the presence of
interest deductibility.
Under a typical leasing arrangement, the lessee purchases (or already has
purchased) the property in question. The lessor "purchases" it, usingup to 90%
borrowed money, which we shall assume is lent by the lessee. Over the period of
the lease, the lessor gets the opportunity to take the applicable investment
tax credit and depreciation deductions. The lessor makes payments of principal
and interest to the lessee on the outstanding loan, while the lessee makes
payments on the lease. At the end of the term of the lease, the lessor pays off
the balance of the loan and the lessee "repurchases" the equipment at a price
specified in the lease. By arranging for principal and interest payments to
equal lease payments, and for the repurchase price to equal the terminal loan
balance, the parties to the lease need exchange money only upon the initial
purchase. Moreover, to avoid recapture, they can arrange for the repurchase
price to be nearly zero.
Under such an agreement, the lessor would have to pay taxes over the course
of the lease on the difference between lease payments made by the lessee and
interest payments made to the lessee. Similarly, the lessee, if taxable in
future years, would get the benefit of tax deductions of equal size. Thus, the—32—
initial amount transferred from lessor to lessee constitutes only part of the
"payment" the lessor makes to buy the lessee's depreciation deductions and tax
credit.
For a lease of length T, with matching level annual payments, a zero
repurchase price and a loan interest rate of i, the initial payment that would
yield a zero present value for the lessor over the entire transaction is:
x =tA—B(l—TA)
where A is the combined present value (in terms of equivalent deductions) of the
asset's investment credit and recovery allowances, as defined in Thble 5, tisthe
lessor's marginal tax rate (normally 16 percent since lessors xast be corpora-










Various values for the initial payment, x, and the annual lease payments, F, for
hypothetical leases involving the three personal property examples used in—33—
Tables 5 and 6 are presented in Table7.The main result in Table 7 is that
though the initial payment, x, is far less than the value of credits and deduc-
tions to the lessor, TA,itis not very sensitive to the discount rate used.
For example, a lessor with a discount rate of 12 percent would pay 21.2 cents
for a five—year lease per dollar of assets in the five—year recovery class; this
figure would be 20.5 cents if the lessor had a discount rate of 6.L8 percent.22
A fully worked out example of one of these transactions appears in Table 8,
for a five—year lease of a five—year asset and a 12 percent discount rate.23_3)4_
Table7
LeaseCharacteristics
(interest rate =12%;asset price =1dollar)
Recovery Discount Lease Value of' Deductions Initial Lease
Class Rate (p) Term plus Credit (rA) Payment (x) Payments (F)
3 years 12% 3 .146'?' .160 .3149
10 3 .475 .1514 .352
6.148 3 .1489 .1142 .357
12 5 .467 .212 .218
10 5 .1475 .202 .221
6.48 5 .489 .180 .227
5years 12 5 .1467 .212 .218
10 5 .479 .209 .219
6.148 5 .5014 .205 .220
12 10 .467 .303 .123
10 10 .479 .297 .1214
6.48 10 .504 .279 .128—35--
Table8
A Sample Leasing Transaction
Year 1982 1983 19814 1985 1986 1987
1. Purchase 100.00 0 0 0 0 0
2.Loan 18.85 0 0 0 0 0
3.Loan Repayments 0 12.142 13.90 15.57 17.143 19.53
14.Loan Balance 78.85 66.143 52.53 36.96 19.53 0
5. Interest Payments 0 9.145 7.97 6.30 14.1414 2.314
6. Lease Receipts 0 21.87 21.87 21.87 21.87 21.87
7'. Depreciation Allowances 15 22 21 21 21 0
8. Investment Credit 10 0 0 0 0 0
9. Tax* —16.90 —14.14i —3.27 —2.50 —1.614 8.98
10. Cash Flow** —14.25 14.141 3.27 2.50 1.614 —8.98
Present Value (discounted at 12 percent) =.02dollars
*Tax = .146x(6—5—7)—8
**CashFlow =(2—1)+(6—14—5)—9=2—1—9—36—
Wenext consider the relative position of different types of firms, with the
availability of safe harbor leasing. If a fully—taxable firm sells and then
leases an asset from one in similar circumstances, the tax effects should can-
cel, with respect to bot the ITC and depreciation deductions and the taxes on
lease payments net of interest payments. Should the lessee be a Trpe I firm
with no taxable income jr-i the year of the lease but taxable income thereafter,
the lease will allow the full tax benefits of ACRS to be obtained, but the taxes
on lease payments net of interest payments will still cancel. Thus, the lessee
has been enabled to gain a position siailar to the fully—taxable firm. Finally,
however, consider the non—taxable pe II firm as lessee. It gets the full.
value of the asset's depreciation deductions, but it pays no taxes on the income
the asset generates. This appears to place it in a favored position relative to
the other firms. However, there are two extenuating factors here. First, the
non—taxable lessee cannot take advantage of the deductions of lease payments
made net of interest received from the lessor, while the lessor must include the
difference in income. Naturally, two firms in this situation could lengthen the
term of the lease substantially, and in so doing make the loan repayments
smaller, although the term of a lease cannot exceed the greater of 150 percent
of the asset's ADR midpoint life and 90 percent of its "useful life" as defined
under section 167 of the Internal Revenue Code. In addition, to the extent that
the 'Irpe II firm finances its investment with borrowing of its own, it cannot
deduct the interest payments, while a firm with taxable profits can. Together,
these two factors will probably not give the advantage to the taxable firm, but
they will lessen the disadvantage from which it suffers relative to the non—
taxable firm.—37—
Ofcourse, what makes a sale—leaseback agreement really different from the
sale of credits and deductions is the risk undertaken by the lessor that the
lessee will enter bankruptcy. What the position of the lessor would be in such
a case is a legal issue that can not be judged here.—38—
VII.Conclusions
The Accelerated Cost Recovery System included in the Economic Recovery 'Ix
Act of 1981 reduced greatly the tax burden on nonresidential and non—owner—
occupied residential investment in the U.S. undertaken after January 1, 1981, to
the extent that it will largely offset the corporation income tax in future
years. However, its effects are quite different from the simple abolition of
the corporate tax. The effective corporate tax rate is not zero, but varies
widely across assets and is negative for many. The opportunity to deduct
interest payments makes the effective tax rates on debt—financed investments
still lower. What will keep corporate tax collections positive is many firms
continuing at least for a time to derive a large portion of their income from
sources other than depreciable personal property purchased after January 1,
1981. Those firms not in this category will be able to sell part of their
losses to those that are through safe—harbor leases. Thus, the smallness of
corporate tax collections will mask what is happening: some investments, being
taxed effectively at substantially negative rates being used to shelter others
that face positive tax rates.
Regardless of whether reductions in capital income taxes were in general a
good idea, ACRS appears to have accomplished this objective in a rather compli-
cated and distortionary way.—39—
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